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Continuing Conundrum of Mistakes: Where the Dodd-Frank
Act Went Wrong
Shipra Mehta*
INTRODUCTION
After the most recent financial crisis that befell the United States,
financial federal regulations governing the country’s financial institu-
tions required drastic restructuring.  After a great deal of debate and
consideration of the various alternatives, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank” or
the “Act”), was enacted into federal law by President Obama in July
2010.
Before the Act, in 2008, financial federal regulation needed changes
for three primary reasons.  First, the ongoing emergency that the
country was being assaulted with began in housing and credit markets,
but the effects spread and it was eventually followed by the collapse of
many financial institutions and a subsequent recession.1  Second,
breakdowns in the enforcement and fraud deterrence goals of federal
financial regulation led to the possibility of some financial fraud
schemes that left some investors reeling.2  Finally, the misalignment
between the federal regulation firms and the intermediaries led to
inefficient and ineffective enforcement of the regulations that were
already in place.3  Due to these primary concerns underlying the des-
perate need for federal restructuring, the ideas underlying the Dodd-
Frank took root.
The Dodd-Frank Act is characterized as a major overhaul of the
United States system of financial sector regulation.4  The purpose of
enacting the Act was to address some of the glaring issues raised by
the recent financial crisis by filing some of the significant gaps identi-
fied in the pre-crisis regulatory framework.5  However, despite the
* Juris Doctor, Certificate in Business Law, DePaul University College of Law, 2015.
1. Joel Seligman, Tyrell Williams Lecture: Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for Inde-
pendent Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2011).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Saule T. Omarova, Article: The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age?, 15 N.C.
Banking Inst. 83, 84 (2001).
5. Id.
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eventual identified goal of the Act, it falls short as it provides too
many loopholes and little substantive guidance to ensure that it actu-
ally accomplishes what it is purported to do, leading to the several
criticisms.6  Rather than providing a workable system that provides
the regulators with authority and tools to deal with systemic risk, the
Act requires over two hundred and twenty-five new financial rules
across eleven agencies, which again does not provide very little sub-
stantive guidance.7
Moreover, despite the multitude of new rules, the legislation con-
tains several gaps and omissions that the run the risk of the Act being
inadequate to sufficiently protect the American public.  Through its
primary focus on minimizing systemic risk, the Act leaves several
other areas unprotected, and thus inadvertently increases the chances
of systemic risk.  Therefore, the Act must be supplemented with fur-
ther measures such as a global regulator that could fill the holes in the
areas the Act leaves unprotected while simultaneously providing dis-
incentives to firms from never-ending growth and thus widen its pro-
tective and regulatory breadth.
Part II of this Article examines the general provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act, including providing further detail regarding Title IV, the
section applicable to hedge funds. Section III examines several of the
criticisms commentators have stated about the Dodd-Frank Act re-
garding its primary focus on systemic risk at the expense of other ar-
eas such as deficiencies in the existing and newly implemented
organization structure, inconsistencies in regulation, minimal empha-
sis on investor protection, and lack of an international focus.  Section
III then proposes a solution that could minimize if not eradicate sev-
eral of the criticisms through the implementation of an international
regulator.
BACKGROUND
The Dodd-Frank Act Generally
The Act’s goal is to reduce systemic risk within the American finan-
cial system through the implementation of several procedures and in-
stitutions.  The primary way the Act accomplishes this is by subjecting
all important financial activities within the United States to an ulti-
6. Id.
7. Viral Acharya, Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson, Richard Sylla, Ingo Walter, A
Critical Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, (No-
vember 24, 2010) http://www.voxeu.org/article/dodd-frank-critical-assessment (last visited March
20, 2016).
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mate financial regulator overseeing systemic risk.  This is accom-
plished via several steps such as providing more effective
coordination, establishing new powers for the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, reducing gaps and omissions within the regula-
tions, and enacting substantive limits that should reduce financial
risk.8  Now, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter
“Council”) has the authority to require new capital, liquidity and risk
management standards for banks and non-bank financial companies.9
The initial increase of powers afforded to certain organizations is sup-
plemented by new enhanced monitoring, supervision and enforcement
methods that are designed to minimize, if not prevent, potential sys-
tem-wide economic harms while expanding regulatory authority over
large, inter-connected non-bank financial institutions.10
In terms of the perceived gaps and omissions that were present
within the financial regulation prior to the Act, the Act attempts har-
monization by making regulatory departments and agencies less inde-
pendent of each other along with the executive and legislative
branches.11  With an increased focus on regulatory coordination
amongst the pertinent agencies and departments, the Act attempts to
optimize early warning and quick responses to growing crises before
they happen rather than as a reactive measure.12  All these measures
are primarily designed to minimize systemic risk within the industry.
Systemic risk has been such a major concern of the financial industry
that many of the regulations imposed since the recent financial crisis
are geared towards minimizing it.13  In fact, even before the Dodd-
Frank Act was passed, the regulatory organizations that were involved
with mitigating the harmful effects of the recession seemed to focus on
minimizing systemic risk from the very beginning.
One of the Act’s most controversial changes is the enactment of
Title IV, which deals primarily with investment companies such as
hedge funds, which will be discussed in further detail below.
8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Cheryl D. Block, A Continuum Approach to Systemic Risk and Too-Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 293 (2012).
11. Seligman, supra note 1, at 6.
12. Id.
13. Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal to Expand Inves-
tor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87, 101 (2012).  For
example, in response to the financial crisis, Congress created the Congressional Oversight Panel,
which then released a report in January 2009 that analyzed the then current state of the regula-
tory system and made specific recommendations for regulatory reform.  Many of those recom-
mendations focused on identifying and regulating financial institutions that posed a systemic risk
to the economy. Id. at 101-102.
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Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
As the title applicable to hedge funds, one of the more impactful
changes contained within Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act (hereinafter
“Title IV”) is changes to investment adviser registration under the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 (hereinafter “Investment Advisers
Act”) that applies to almost all investment advisers.14  Title IV sets
standards for when investment advisers must register under the In-
vestment Advisers Act; it does not always necessarily require adviser
registration as there are times when registration is required, it is op-
tional and even when it is prohibited.15  Title IV also clarifies the au-
thority to define “client” under certain situations, imposes new and
improved recording and reporting requirements, modifies the custody
obligations on registered investment advisers and adjusts the “quali-
fied client” and “accredited investor” suitability standards under the
Advisers Act and the Securities Act of 1933.16  Finally, Title IV seems
to provide clearer Congressional guidance on what constitutes sys-
temic risk and scales the registration and reporting requirements
accordingly.17
The general policy underlying all these changes imposed by Title IV
is based on the premise that larger hedge funds and private equity
investment advisers should be governed by federal regulation while
smaller investment advisers and venture capital advisers can be left to
state regulation.18  However, this still leaves the door open for in-
creased federal regulation for mid-sized investment advisers.19  This is
just an example of the Act’s nearsightedness on how in its narrow
focus on systemic risk, it could actually increase the potential for sys-
temic risk.
ANALYSIS
Despite all the effort and research before the Act was implemented,
there are still numerous criticisms regarding the Act, one of the pri-
mary ones being related to systemic risk.20  Based on the numerous
gaps, omissions and deficiencies discussed below, it is evident that by
focusing almost primarily on minimizing systemic risk, the Act leaves
14. Seth Chertok, A Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Securities and Exchange Commission MCMXXXIV, Staff Report (2003).
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open several possibilities through which systemic risk could actually
increase, endangering the economy as a whole.  Essentially, due to its
narrow focus, the Act may fail to do exactly what it was designed to
prevent.
Criticisms of the Dodd-Frank Act
Despite the fact that the Act was considered to solve a majority if
not all the problems that befell the American financial system and
that led to the subsequent recession, criticisms of the Act abound.
One of the most prominent criticisms is that by focusing almost exclu-
sively on the reduction of systemic risk, the Act has not made changes
that could actually impact the financial industry if a crisis like this re-
occurred, and has left some substantial gaps within the regulatory de-
vices.  Some commentators have even theorized that let alone the Act
not implementing changes that could actually impact the financial in-
dustry, the Act has an innate principal inability to minimize systemic
risk.21  Several factors contribute to the inability.
First, the approach that Dodd-Frank follows just builds on the old
financial regulatory agencies’ structure; it does not actually make the
structural changes needed to prevent another widespread economic
crash from occurring.22  By strengthening the power and authority of
most of the older agencies such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve
System, these agencies “won” even though they were the ones that
completely failed in reacting in an adequate and appropriate manner,
which did not help in resolving the crisis.23  Just because they were the
ones with the power, they still left the fracas unscathed and holding
the baton despite their recent mistakes.  The same basic structure that
most likely contributed to the latest crisis still remains with a few su-
perficial changes.
Along the same lines, prior to the Act, banks seemed to contain a
large amount of systemic risk within the industry; today, while they
may not pose as much of a risk directly, non-banks perform bank-like
functions that still contain the earlier risks along with the new risks
introduced into the financial markets that are not directly addressed
by the Act.24  Changes have not been made to actually counteract
risks present within a “bank-esque” organization. By not recognizing
21. Charles Whitehead, Local to Global: Rethinking spheres of Authority After a World Finan-
cial Crisis: Regulating for the Next Financial Crisis, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 3, 5 (2011).
22. Seligman, supra note 1, at 6.
23. Id.
24. Whitehead, supra note 21, at 5.
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the “fluidity” of the risk being transferred from banks to less-regu-
lated firms, many risk factors are left unregulated that might still
majorly impact the financial industries.25
Second, the Act affords a great deal of power to the Council as a
way of minimizing systemic risk through more coordinative regula-
tions and substantive limits, but the question arises whether the Coun-
cil has any actual power.  Various components of the Council’s
organizational structure prevent it from functioning as an effective
tool to actually reduce systemic risk.  For example, the Council only
meets occasionally, it does not have the staffing resources that the
other agencies have making it dependent on other agencies for en-
forcement, and it is chaired by the Secretary of Treasury rather than
an independent individual.26  All these factors aggregated really re-
strict the Council’s ability to perform its duties.  With these types of
limitations on the Council’s power, the Council runs the risk of being
a sword without an edge that can become utterly meaningless in a
fight.
Also, the Act names the Council as a mediator between the agen-
cies involved in the financial industry, which in theory is a step in the
right direction but in actuality may not have effect.  The question
arises whether the Council actually has the power to mediate the dis-
putes that are bound to arise if the regulatory agencies are not able to
coordinate their industry specific objectives with the Act’s objec-
tives.27  If the Council does not have enough manpower to do fulfill its
responsibilities without borrowing resources from other agencies, how
is it supposed to enforce mandates against those same agencies it re-
lies on?  The extent of limitations on the Council’s power are even
more disturbing considering the lack of clear guidance as to what con-
stitutes systemic risk, as discussed below.  Because the Dodd-Frank
Act does not actually define “systemic risk,” the Council is required to
determine which risks are systemic with its minimal powers and po-
tential susceptibility of being influenced.28  While there are always ad-
vantages to flexibility and taking into account changes within the
financial market, the concern is present that the Council may just not
have the resources or the actual power to define systemic risk and
take affirmative action to prevent it.29
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 11
29. See id. at 11.
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One criticism that deals with Title IV specifically is that through the
regulations that set forth standards for when an investment adviser
must register under the Advisers Act, Title IV does not recognize that
private equity funds probably do not also create systemic risk due to
their structuring and mode of operations; yet, it imposes increased
federal regulation on them.30  While requiring registration for a non-
contributory entity, Title IV ignores smaller hedge funds. Title IV
does not impose too much regulatory oversight over smaller hedge
funds via the means of registration under the Advisers Act.  However,
studies demonstrate the inaccuracy of that viewpoint in that they are
much likelier to commit investment adviser fraud.31  The smaller
funds are likelier to commit fraud than the bigger ones because the
larger and more established funds are already under heightened scru-
tiny from their institutional investors that small hedge funds may not
necessarily attract.32  With more institutional investors comes in-
creased due diligence regarding the funds, which functions as an addi-
tional barrier against fraudulent activity.33  In general, the regulations
seem more focused towards individual firms where each firm is con-
sidered separately without taking into consideration the effect of coor-
dinated conduct amongst the market participants.34
By focusing primarily on systemic risk at the expense of investor
protection, the Act ignores the very possible reality of losing investors
due to the vast informational asymmetry between the funds and the
investors.35  Informational asymmetries make it much more difficult
for investors to know the true value of their investments, which could
cause the hedge fund industry to lose investors.36  Because the mar-
kets are all inter-connected, the hedge fund industry’s loss of investors
could adversely impact the overall stability of the economy, thereby
increasing the systemic risk.37  Once again, this demonstrates that by
focusing almost exclusively on minimizing systemic risk at the expense
of other principles, the Act is instead perpetuating the various pos-
sibilities through which systemic risk could increase.
30. Chertok, supra note 14, at 6.
31. Martin, supra note 13, at 109.  The Alternative Investment Management Association actu-
ally found that most hedge fund fraud cases involved advisers with $25,000,000 under their man-
agement. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Whitehead, supra note 21, at 6.
35. Martin, supra note 13, at 123.
36. Id. at 123-125.
37. Id.
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Furthermore, Act has invested heavily in preventive regulation and
supervision to prevent a future crisis through the creation of new insti-
tutions to monitor for future shocks and to direct financial firms to
reduce their exposure to systemic crises.38  However, economic shocks
are rarely predictable and they usually happen so suddenly that bu-
reaucracies cannot respond effectively.39  With the type of federal reg-
ulation that the Act imposes and the agencies more interdependent on
each other with the goal towards cooperation, the bureaucracy just
seems to be getting bigger.  Rationally, it would be even harder pres-
ently than it was before to convince the agencies to agree on a mode
of response.  Again, this difficulty ties back to the inherent weakness
in the organizational structure with the Council’s lack of power for
enforcement and implementation, and thus the response time would
be substantially longer.
Not only is the size of the bureaucracy an issue, it is not realistic to
expect that all future failures will be carefully managed under govern-
mental supervision due the “domino effect.”40  When one institution
fails, that is not necessarily caused by systemic risk that could collapse
an entire economy; instead, the failure of one institution could set off
a domino effect of other institutions’ failures due to interconnections
between the institutions and the chance that the risks faced by each
institution are closely correlated as a whole.41
While greater regulatory oversight is a step towards the right direc-
tion, sole reliance on that is not enough due to factors such as the
inherent fragility of financial institutions, interconnections among the
institutions, the close relation of the risks they face, and the political
economy of financial regulation.42  Based on these innate weaknesses
within the industry, despite the increased federal regulation, there will
still not be enough advance prediction of a financial collapse.  Even if
the prediction is accurate, the response will not be adequate.43  Along
with the weaknesses within the market as a whole, studies show that
there is a recurring cyclical pattern.  After a market crash, there is
always a period of rigorous regulation with increased scrutiny, that is
then always followed by gradual relaxation of the rules.44  This recur-
38. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 797 (2011).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 799.
41. Id. at 801.
42. Id. at 802.
43. Id.
44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 815 (2011).
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ring cycle usually occurs because human nature dictates that bounded
rationality is an appropriate mode of behavior, which leads to being
predictably blindsided by a new crisis.45  Due to bounded rationality,
there are cognitive limitations on the ability of private entities and
public regulators to perceive new risks, which is why the emphasis on
preventive measures will never function as they ought to as a protec-
tor of the financial industry.46  Based on this cycle, the supervisory and
preventive measures that are supposed to minimize systemic risk will
eventually be relaxed.  With the government’s almost sole reliance on
these measures, the economy will be left vulnerable.
A highly prevalent criticism of the Dodd-Frank Act is that despite
the emphasis the Act places on systemic risk, there is still no clear
definition of what exactly constitutes systemic risk, which creates un-
certainties as to when systemic regulation should apply and the type of
events that can trigger a regulatory intervention.47  One of the more
common descriptions is that once an economic shock occurs that af-
fects at least one financial institution or market, the shock then affects
the flow of capital, which limits the ability of borrowers to make new
investments and then impacts the broader economy as a whole.48
However, that is one of many definitions and even if it is accepted, it
is not clear enough to provide any real guidance.  By not providing a
clear definition of systemic risk, the Act also ignores the problem of
negative externalities, which includes the effect of losses resulting
from risks borne by financial firms that can extend to others within
the economy at a large.49  The Act’s purpose is to provide regulatory
organizations such as the Council the ability to step in and try to re-
strict the amounts and types of risk-bearing a financial firm can as-
sume, but without an actual definition of what could lead to “systemic
risk” for an individual firm, the regulatory organizations may not be
able to do so.50  Majority of the Act’s “systemic risk” requires imple-
mentation of regulation that allow the regulators discretion to modify
the statutory standards or issue exemptions; but, without a clear defi-
nition of systemic risk, those charged with implementing the new rules
may have a hard time coordinating regulation, minimizing their ex-
pended efforts.51
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Whitehead, supra note 21, at 7.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 9.
51. Id. at 10.
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Because the focus of defining “systemic risk” within the Act has
been on entities that are “too big” or “too interconnected to fail,”, it is
unclear that without a clear definition, whether an organization like
the Council would even be able to determine which entities are sys-
temically important or when their failure would create a systemic
problem.52  There is just too much ambiguity in what constitutes and
leads to systemic risk, and as history as shown, reaffirmed by the re-
cent financial crisis, the markets do not react well to ambiguity.53  By
not providing clear guidance of what is systemic risk, the Act might
not be able minimize systemic risk exactly when it is needed the most.
Finally, by focusing so much on systemic risk, while still leaving
many gaps, the Act ignores several of the investor protection issues
created by the hedge fund industry.54  Traditionally, investor protec-
tion was considered to be a non-issue with hedge funds due to the
sophistication of the investors and the presumption that they could
fend for themselves.  However, commentators have posited that re-
gardless of their level of sophistication, the informational challenges
that the investors face prevents them from adequately protecting
themselves, which in turn worsens the systemic risk inadequacies.55
Despite the relative sophistication of hedge fund investors, the overall
impact on investor protection is minimal, which then again impacts
systemic risk.  By not imposing affirmative requirements on hedge
funds in favor of investor protection, the Act does not provide incen-
tives against bad behavior such as fraud, which leads to systemic risk.
As discussed above, because of the structure of many of these finan-
cial institutions, a defect in one can have widespread consequences
and impact the rest of the economy.  Rather than focusing on investor
protection, the Act focuses more on systemic risk, thereby missing the
possible connections between the two.
Alternatives to the Dodd-Frank Act
Due to the onslaught of criticism that began almost immediately
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, numerous alternatives
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Martin, supra note 13, at 89.
55. Id. at 90.  Some of these informational challenges include: (1) lack of standardization
within the industry especially regarding disclosure practices, risk assessments and valuation pro-
cedures; (2) lack of standardization along with a limited public disclosure regime makes it very
hard for investors to adequately investigate a particular hedge fund investment; and (3) difficulty
for investors to choose an optimal hedge fund investment because the informational challenges
make it harder for them to compare a wide range of hedge fund opportunities that then limits
investor choice and competition within the industry. Id.
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have been proposed that could fill in the gaps that are still left wide
open by the Act.  This Article proposes that the institution of an inter-
national financial regulator is best suited to solve many of the
problems left unresolved by the Dodd-Frank Act, while also disincen-
tivizing firms from becoming “too big to fail”.
Implementation of an international financial regulator takes care of
many of the prevalent criticisms of the Act for several reasons.  First,
the Act is almost COMPLETELY silent about the international dimen-
sion of finance; due to the globalized nature of our society, interna-
tional coordination is going to be required to deal with another crisis
when it comes.56  While the Act deals with Ponzi schemes similar to
Bernie Madoff’s and need to the assess the level of systemic risk im-
posed by hedge funds, the focus is only within the American financial
system.57  However, that ignores the reality which is that within the
present financial structure, many hedge funds are global with interna-
tional investors.  Focusing only on American risks leaves open literally
an entire world of potential sources of systemic risk that are unac-
counted for.
In order to truly combat systemic risk and reduce the chances of
another financial collapse, there must be a single global regulator of
hedge funds custodians to detect fraud and assess the level of systemic
risk imposed by hedge funds in the global financial system.58  Imple-
mentation of an internal regulator does not need reversal of the Act
or even counteract its effects.  Instead, this global regulatory body
would work in conjunction with provisions that are already present
within the Act. For example, Section 411 of the Act authorizes the
SEC to adopt rules requiring investment advisers to hedge funds to
safeguard client assets over which they have custody.59  This provision
would remove the ability of an investment adviser to pay the proceeds
invested by new investors to old investors, which is exactly what
Bernie Madoff managed to accomplish through his Ponzi scheme.60
However, this is not enough by itself; the global regulator would
oversee these custodians.  The custodians would then be required to
submit sufficient information for effective oversight to protect inves-
tors and assess the level of systemic risk posed by hedge funds within
56. Seligman, supra note 1, at 12.
57. Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the
Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems,
31 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 637, 641 (2011).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 690.
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the global financial system.61  While the Act has taken massive steps
towards remedying a non-transparent segment of the American finan-
cial system, its effectiveness in furthering investor protection and pro-
tection against systemic risk needs additional steps, which would be
accomplished by a single global regulator.62  The SEC even empha-
sized this based on Commissioner Casey’s statement in front of the
Senate Banking Committee, where she stated: “[t]he [SEC’s] commit-
ment to international cooperation has become increasingly important
to its mission in recent years in response to the increasingly global
nature of financial markets.”63
This is in recognition that many hedge funds and their advisers are
global entities that are interdependent within the global financial sys-
tem, as evidenced by the spread of the 2008 financial crisis that spread
to most major financial centers, regardless of what country they were
located in.64  Furthermore, the regulation must be global because dif-
ferent national standards for each individual country’s financial insti-
tutions make it possible for regulatory arbitrage and gaps in
oversight.65
Along with acting as a single regulator for entities that already tran-
scend territorial and sovereign boundaries, this global regulator would
also function as a verifiable comprehensive non-industry controlled
source of information about hedge funds and their nature and scope.66
As discussed above, Title IV is severely lacking in implementing pro-
tective measures for investors, and a financial global regulator could
cure numerous of those defects.  For example, not all prospective in-
vestors have the capacity or the expertise to analyze the information
they receive about hedge funds, and even if they have the ability,
there is limited transparency because hedge funds are not required to
provide extensive disclosures to their investors unlike mutual funds.67
Without a mandatory disclosure regime, relevant information is not
provided to its regulators, which is needed to better detect investment
adviser fraud.68
61. Id. at 642.
62. Id. at 696.
63. Nichols, supra note 57 at 696, (quoting International Cooperation to Modernize Financial
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin. of Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r Sec. & Exch.
Com.m’n)).
64. Id. at 696.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 697.
67. Martin, supra note 13, at 113-115.
68. Id. at 116.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\14-2\DPB203.txt unknown Seq: 13 26-MAY-16 14:52
2015] CONTINUING CONUNDRUM OF MISTAKES 245
With the implementation of a global financial regulator, the entity
could impose a mandatory disclosure regime that Title IV is lacking,
which would enhance the transparency between the funds and the in-
vestors.  This would better facilitate the selection process for hedge
funds by giving the investors the tools necessary to compare the vari-
ous funds and find one that best suits their needs.  In order for them
to accurately select one that best suits their needs, there must be a
standardized method for investors to compare and aggregate risks
across various portfolios, which there currently is not.69  The federal
regulator would provide a standardized method of comparison be-
tween the various portfolios.  Because hedge fund advisers would be
required to submit the pertinent information to their national regula-
tor, who would then submit the information to the international regu-
lator, potential investors would have one source through which it
could examine all the relevant information that is important to them
and select accordingly.  The global regulator would also provide an
additional layer of protection against fraudulent activities.70
Based on the numerous advantages that are present with a federal
regulator, coupled with the detrimental effects if the regulation of
hedge funds is left to each individual country, a new institution should
be implemented that would be truly global.  This global regulator
must oversee the hedge fund advisers and custodians, with each coun-
try’s systemic risk regulator reporting directly to this entity.71  Addi-
tionally, to ensure that this global regulator has actual power and is
not left in limbo where it might or might not have power, the imple-
mentation of global regulatory decisions need to be mandatory in
each member country.72
Moreover, to ensure that this global regulator is not stepping similar
to how national regulators have had to step in the past for firms that
69. Id. at 121.  The four components of risk that are generally evaluated are volatility, diversi-
fication, leverage and liquidity. Id. at 122.  Volatility is the amount of uncertainty associated
with the value of a particular investment. Id.  Diversification is the extent to which a portfolio
includes a wide variety of investments. Id.  Leverage is the ratio of a firm’s debt to its equity
capital, while liquidity is whether an investment can be easily sold or exchanged for cash without
a subsequent substantial loss in value.  Martin, supra note 13, at 122.
70. See id. at 120. Not only is there limited transparency, there is also a lack of standardized
valuation mechanisms that are consistent across the industry, which is especially concerning be-
cause hedge fund managers are compensated based on the overall value of the fund’s assets,
thereby creating a general concern that managers have an incentive to inflate valuations to in-
crease their compensation. Id.  Having a federal regulator would also allow the entity to impose
standard valuation practices, which would streamline the compensation packages hedge fund
managers receive, precluding any inclination to participate in fraudulent activities.
71. Nichols, supra note 57, at 698.
72. Id.
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are “too big to fail,” which were part of the cause of the recent crisis,
firms must be disincentivized from getting so large.  The “too big to
fail” has been at least the American government’s policy of awarding
discretionary support to a firm’s underinsured creditors, which rather
than helping the industry, has actually impeded the industry.73  When
governmental bodies are consistently intervening to support distressed
financial institutions, the expectation of intervention continues,
thereby increasing the chances of these firms taking excessive risks
based on their confidence of an intervention if they border insol-
vency.74  Rather, with the possibility of a bailout, financial firms have
the incentive to continue growing to reach the “too big to fail status,”
which leads to excessive risk-taking and economic waste.75  Thus,
along with creating an international financial regulator, disincentives
must be provided to firms to discourage them from the incessant
growth.  It is important that even with an international financial regu-
lator, firms are disinclined to take steps for excessive growth.
While not too much is studied about the costs of imposing an inter-
national financial regulator, an analogy can be drawn to other areas
involving hedge funds.  For example, one commentator has empha-
sized an increased need for investor protection regarding hedge funds,
but even she agreed that there may be some costs such as deterrence
for hedge funds operating within the United States, political hurdles
and cost limitations.76  Those same costs would also apply to the
global regulator.  With an overall “supervisory” entity overlooking
and scrutinizing the hedge funds’ moves, the funds may be deterred
from operating in countries that are members of the global regulatory
organization.  In order for the global regulations to work, countries
would need to agree to become members of the organization, and not
every country may do so. Therefore, hedge fund managers may be
deterred from operating in countries that have signed onto the regula-
tory organization, which could then impact the overall strength of the
economy.
Second, political hurdles are bound to arise in an international or-
ganization comprised of nations that have their own interests and
agendas to push.  Not only are conflicts of interest bound to arise be-
tween various members, some countries might also balk at the notion
73. Elisa S. Kao, Article: Moral Hazard During the Savings and Loan Crisis and the Financial
Crisis of 2008-09: Implications for Reform and the Regulation of Systemic Risk Through Disin-
centive Structures to Manage Firm Size and Interconnectedness, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
817, 823 (2012).
74. Id. at 823-824.
75. Id. at 824.
76. Martin, supra note 13, at 138-40.
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of taking orders from a third party that could detrimentally impact
their national economy.  Under the assumption that at least half the
countries would sign to be a part of the international regulatory or-
ganization, the global regulator would have a momentous task ahead
of it in balancing the various countries’ competing interests, while en-
suring that its mandates are being followed and the purpose of the
organization is fulfilled.  Finally, there are cost limitations associated
with the international regulator; it would need a vast amount of re-
sources in terms of manpower and capital to function.  Not only would
it need to have the capabilities to process all the acquired information
to provide accurate information about systemic risk within the indus-
try, it would also need to provide comprehensive information for in-
vestors to understand and analyze in furtherance of the increased
transparency and investor protection objectives.  In order to enforce
its mandates to ensure that all member countries are abiding by its
dictates, the international regulator needs manpower for enforcement,
lest it become an organization similar to the Council, one with no bite.
However, despite these costs that are associated with the interna-
tional regulator and the kinks that need to be worked out, the benefits
associated with a truly global financial organization far outweigh the
associated costs, especially considering the power it could take to min-
imize if not prevent another economy crisis similar to the one that
recently struck the United States’ financial economy and then spread
throughout.
CONCLUSION
The Dodd-Frank Act was a great step in the right direction towards
rectifying several of the mistakes that contributed to the latest eco-
nomic downturn.  However, there are several omissions and gaps
throughout the legislation, especially in Title IV’s provisions on hedge
funds, that ignore numerous of the realities of today’s financial mar-
ket.  By focusing almost exclusively on systemic risk at the expense of
other areas that are deserving of protection, the Act has instead per-
petuated some of the same risk factors that led to the economy crash.
A global financial regulator functions to fill in many of the gaps that
are left open by the current Act, while simultaneously promoting
other areas such as increased focus on transparency and investor pro-
tection.  Even though there may be increased costs associated with a
global financial regulator, the benefits far outweigh the costs.  One of
the greatest benefits to an international regulator is that it can work in
conjunction with the provisions already implemented; a restructuring
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of the rules is not required.  Thus, to truly minimize systemic risk,
which is what Dodd-Frank is geared to do, an international financial
regulator is an effective tool.
